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of the Confederacy. Areas of "persistent Unionism" such as East Tennessee, west-
ern Virginia, and coastal Virginia and North Carolina produced more political
prisoners than other areas for which records survive. The mere "belief in the polit-
ical idea of the Union" was a frequent cause for arresting political prisoners.
Furthermore, Neely perceptively suggests, Confederate ideology allowed south-
erners to label northerners as "alien enemies" and expel them from the South,
while Union war aims forced northerners to consider southern sympathizers politi-
cal prisoners.
Neely concludes his examination of civil liberties in the Confederacy by
examining Jefferson Davis's evolving policies and comparing them to those of
Abraham Lincoln. Much of the initial difference between the two presidents' poli-
cies centered on their relationship to the border slave states. Davis needed to
induce them to leave the Union; Lincoln had to convince them to remain in the
Union. By late 1862, when it was clear that the border states would not join the
Confederacy, Davis adopted harsher measures to deal with internal dissent. By
1864, he came to the conclusion that "civil rights would have to be sacrificed to
military necessity" (p. 165). In the final analysis, both Davis and Lincoln ignored
constitutional restrictions on government authority in their quest to hold on to ter-
ritory and to win the war. "Under the pressure of a war for national existence, the
Confederate Constitution proved as 'flexible' as the Constitution of the United
States, on which it was modeled. And the white people of the South embraced
order and sacrificed liberty as readily as Northerners did" (p. 169).
Neely's evidence and analysis effectively destroy historians' unexamined
assumptions about confederate fidelity to civil rights during wartime. He also
rightly draws attention to the different imperatives facing the Lincoln and Davis
administrations, especially in their policies toward the border slave states. This
volume will force legal historians to reevaluate the relative reputation of North
and South in violating civilians' civil rights, but they may not, as Neely would
have it, conclude that there was no substantive difference between "the fate of lib-
erty" in the North and in the South during the Civil War.
DANIEL W. STOWELL
The Lincoln Legal Papers
WILLIAM D. POPKIN, Statutes in Court: The History and Theory of Statutory
Interpretation. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999. 340 pp. $54.95.
In his well-written and well-argued book, William D. Popkin delivers on the
promise denoted in his title. Part I of the book details the Anglo-American history
of statutory interpretation. Part 11 begins by surveying the most important contem-
porary theories in the field of statutory interpretation. Part 11 ends with the
author's rejection of these theories and the exposition of his own theory, which he
calls "ordinary judging." Popkin argues that his is "the best perspective for under-
standing the discretionary judicial role [in interpreting statutes] . . . whereby
judges indulge a modest competence to contribute to good government" (p. 3).
The book starts with an examination of the history of the English experience
with judicial interpretation of statutes. Despite England's long common law tradi-
tion, the judge's role in divining the meaning of the acts of Parliament arose only
gradually, because "statutory interpretation could not exist until legislatures devel-
oped a sense of separation from judging" (p. 9). This development took several
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centuries and coincided with Parliament's achievement of a sense of its own insti-
tutional competence as lawmaker and its acquisition of sovereignty, which was
accomplished by the end of the seventeenth century. Before that time, the primary
lawmakers in England were the judges, whose vehicle was the common law. Not
surprisingly, English judges jealously guarded their primacy through devices such
as the canon of statutory construction requiring the narrow interpretation of
statutes that are in derogation of the common law. According to Popkin, "the judi-
cial role in statutory interpretation was broad and undifferentiated," as English
judges continued to view "the common law as the predominant and preeminent
source of law" (p. 18). Nor had this view changed appreciably by Blackstone's
day: eighteenth century judges "took only halting steps toward abandoning" the
practice of equitable interpretation of statutes a practice that regarded the statute's
spirit (as discovered by the judges) as superior to its letter (as enacted by
Parliament) (p. 18). This practice resulted in an extremely active, substantive role
in statutory interpretation and lawmaking on the part of the English judges.
There has been much debate among scholars about the role of judges in statu-
tory interpretation in late eighteenth century America, because, according to
Popkin, the historical evidence from this period is ambiguous. However, late eigh-
teenth century American legal thought regarding the relationship between courts
and legislatures differed from that of England in two ways. First, Americans
viewed legislative sovereignty as a concrete expression of the popular will, some-
thing very separate from judging. Second, the American state legislatures of the
day had more experience as lawmakers than did Parliament. Thus, in America, at
the republic's inception, judgemade law was more "suspect" than in England.
During the nineteenth century, there was increasing reliance on legislation as
a source of law in the United States. But, by the second half of the century, it
appeared that the courts had begun to "set themselves actively against legal
change, whether judicial or legislative, as American judges (perhaps in imitation
of their English brethren) more jealously guarded their common law prerogative
(p. 59). In spite of judicial rhetoric indicating hostility to legislation, Popkin
opines that late nineteenth century American judges often actually engaged in
"ordinary legitimate judging, whereby judges exercised their competence to help
fit statutes into their temporal setting by integrating them with prior law" (p. 97).
He maintains that most of what these judges were doing was legitimate statutory
interpretation, which merely forced legislators to express themselves clearly
regarding how far they "meant to go in changing prior law" (p. 101). In fact, some
of these judges freely invoked the remedial canon of statutory construction, under
which a statute whose purpose was remedial was to be construed liberally; this, in
contradistinction to the traditional canon requiring the narrow interpretation of
statutes in derogation of the common law. In short, nineteenth century American
judicial practice was not nearly so hostile to legislation as much of the judicial
rhetoric suggests.
Still, in all nineteenth century American judges did evince a general tendency
to interpret statutes narrowly, in order to preserve the predominance of the com-
mon law, and, with it, the judicial role in lawmaking. In the twentieth century, the
judicial practice of purposive interpretation reversed this earlier tendency, by
extending the meaning of statutes in order to achieve the perceived legislative
purpose or spirit. With the rise in use of legislative committees to draft statutes,
legislative history became a reliable source for guiding the judicial process of
discovering the meaning of statutory text. Twentieth century America also saw a
vast increase in the competence of legislatures in their role as lawmakers; height-
2000
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY
ened legislative competence "forced courts to be less arrogant regarding statutes
and their own lawmaking potential" (p. 149). By mid-century, most judges "oper-
ated in an environment in which the creative element in purposive judging was
hard to deny; but it was also an environment in which no agreement had been
reached about how careful the judge must be to avoid the exercise of judicial dis-
cretion" (pp. 132-33).
After setting out his view of the history, Popkin, in Part II of the book, pro-
pounds his theory of "ordinary judging." "Ordinary judging" represents a middle
way of statutory interpretation between two extremes: the earlier philosophy that
overstated judicial competence and an indeterminate descriptive pragmatism,
which threatens to leave judges without any basis at all for collaborating with leg-
islatures to work out statutory meaning" (p. 151). In the process of developing his
theory, the author critiques other theoretical bases for statutory interpretation,
most notably textualism and Republicanism. Popkin deprecates modern textual-
ists, who seek to give judges "as little to do as possible by sticking close to statu-
tory language" (p. 153). He rejects the assumption on which textualism is based,
that the statutory text is "a stable and reliable source of information about statuto-
ry meaning on which the judge can rely" (p. 177). Nor, in Popkin's estimation,
does modern Republican theory provide a much better basis for statutory interpre-
tation. Republicanism focuses on "the judge's role in protecting fundamental val-
ues," but the problem is that judges do not necessarily have any greater insight
than other groups when it comes to defining fundamental societal values (p. 199).
Moreover, the traditional substantive canons of statutory construction, on which
both textualist and Republican judges often rely, are themselves contradictory and,
thus, are malleable.
As a result of the inadequacies of both textualism and Republicanism, Popkin
puts forth his theory of "ordinary judging." In this conception of the law, statutes
are neither static nor innocent of their past, and judges can help legislatures make
law" (p. 247). In Popkin's opinion, "ordinary judging" gets the judge's role right,
neither usurping the legislative function (by doing too much), nor abdicating the
judicial function (by doing too little). The 'judge's job is to work out the relation-
ship of specific statements of law (whether from common law decisions or
statutes) to the broader fabric of the law, sensitive to the institutional competence
of various lawmaking institutions" (pp. 247-48). "Ordinary judging" proposes that
judges do just this with due sensitivity to the institutional competence of various
lawmaking institutions, including their own. As the basis for a moderate judicial
role in statutory interpretation, Popkin' s concept of "ordinary judging" presents a
promising and useful tool for courts, legislatures, and legal theorists alike.
STEPHEN R. ALTON
Texas Wesleyan University School of Law
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